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1. Introduction. -Let us consider the time evolution of an isolated physical system, either classical or quantum. Does it always exist, as a matter of principle, a trajectory which, from some initial conditions, gives the values of the different quantities of the system at any time, as it is, for example, the case in Newtonian mechanics? This is the problem of determinism as such, i. e., determinism without any supplementary conditions, in the natural world. Obviously, determinism as such, or simply determinism for short, is sometimes present in the world, but the problem is if determinism is always present irrespective of our capacity of prediction in practice. Thus, for our purpose here it will be enough to give an example where determinism fails, meaning that it enters in contradiction to quantum predictions. This is what we are going to do along the present paper.
Nevertheless, before this, we will consider two objections that, from the very beginning, could be raised against this goal.
The first one would be to say that we are just referring to the time evolution of an isolated physical system, while one could always doubt if there is any physical system which can be considered really isolated.
We will see in the following Section that this objection can be easily neutralized, so let us consider in some detail the second objection, which could be phrased as follows: is not the above claimed fail of determinism denied by the kind or realism still allowed by the reported experimental violation [1] [2] of Bell inequalities [3] [4] ? Notice that, as it is very well known, this violation entails the fail of local realism, but not the fail of the non-local one, i. e., the violation does not deny realism as such. In other words, we could keep realism as such in front of this experimental violation if we renounced to keep locality by leaving aside special relativity, which, on the other side, would raise tremendous experimental and theoretical problems. But, we do not need to have recourse to such a strong assumption in order to leave aside locality since, as pointed out by Bell [5] , we also could rely on a vast conspiracy which, in the frame of determinism, would arrange the causally unconnected hidden variable values in order to produce the correlations, between the two particle measurement outcomes, which are responsible for the observed violation of Bell inequalities. In other words, the conspiracy would make compatible realism as such with the experimental violation of Bell's inequalities. Then, could not this conspiracy also be invoked to see, from the very beginning, that the above claimed fail of determinism as such must be erroneous? We will see in the next Section that this is not the case by actually proving, in a certain case, that determinism enters in contradiction to quantum mechanics. The reason why non local realism can be reconciled with the violation of Bell inequalities but not with determinism is that the determinism assumption is a stronger condition than realism assumption in the case of an EPR experiment. In the last case, one assumes the existence of some hidden variables values behind the outcomes of a couple of measurements performed on two entangled particles, without asking that these hidden values remain the same after performing this couple of measurements. On the contrary, in the case of determinism, one assumes some common hidden variable values (the unknown initial conditions) behind all the successive spontaneous responses of the isolated system along a lapse of time.
Perhaps some reader will find nonsense to resort to such a fantastic idea as the one of the above conspiracy to keep non-locality. Nevertheless, the author does not know what could be more fantastic, wether this conspiracy or what is at stake in the present paper, i. e., the absence of determinism. Thus, from this point of view, to consider the possibility of this conspiracy, as it is made in the present paper, is not only convenient but even necessary.
Finally, one could also ask whether this claimed fail of determinism could encompass, for example, the case of a quantum particle, since it is widely claimed that Bohm [6] has actually built a non-local realistic theory which reproduces all quantum predictions: a nonlocal realistic theory where any quantum particle would have its own well defined trajectory, at least in the absence of measurement, and so a deterministic theory to a certain extent. Then, perhaps this determinism could still be preserved in Bohm's theory framework, when successive measurements on the particle are present. However, in Section 3, we will see that, whatever could be the merits of the Bohm theory, the theory cannot produce this determinism in the presence of measurement and at the same time agree with quantum mechanics (QM), since this determinism enters in contradiction to QM.
2. Determinism as such, the entailed Bell inequalities and its violation. -Let it be a free half one spin particle, on which we perform the following ideal experiment: we first fix three space directions given by the unit 3-vectors a, b and c. Then, we measure successively the particle spin, each time along one of the precedent directions randomly selected.
Let us consider the physical system composed of the half one spin particle plus the affecting environment including the experimental device with the part of this device that selects randomly the measurement direction among the three initially fixed directions. Assume that this global system remains isolated. Now, as it happens for example with the Newtonian determinism (where the initial position and velocity, i. e., the initial conditions, allow us to know the entire particle trajectory), assume strict determinism in the evolution of this global system. By this I mean that not only the successive spin measurement outcomes, say ±1, are determined from the initial conditions, but that the successively selected measurement directions are determined too, let this random selection be performed by a free subject or by any other means. (Notice that I do not put any restrictions on these assumed initial conditions. In particular, they could range over space-time regions not causally connected).
Let us be more precise. Let us denote as λ those initial conditions. Imagine that we have a set of such systems, differing among them by different initial conditions, i. e., by different λ values. We will perform two consecutive measurements on every prepared system of the above set (each system labeled by a value of λ). These two consecutive spin measurements will be performed, respectively, at two times randomly selected among three standing times t 1 , t 2 , and t 3 , along two directions randomly selected among three standing directions given by the above three unit 3-vectors a, b, c. Denote by S the values, ±1, of the measurement outcomes. Because of the determinism postulate, there exist some initial conditions, i. e., some parameter values, λ, such that we can write S = S(λ, t i , x(t i )), i = 1, 2, 3, for these outcomes, corresponding to a given value of λ and t i , with x(t i ) ∈ ( a, b, c). Notice that the notation is redundant, since because of the postulate of determinism once we have fixed λ and t i the value of S becomes determined. Notice too that, because of the postulate of determinism, shifting as an all the three above times while keeping λ fixed is equivalent to keep the three original times while changing in a convenient way the original initial conditions. Now, we are going to mimic the original proof of Bell inequalities [3] in order to prove similar inequalities for our measurement outcomes. Let us consider the following three expectation values
where ρ(λ) stands for the probability density of the λ values. But, we could doubt if we can put, as we have done, the same output value, S(λ, t 2 , b) in (1) and in (3), since in the first case this value is paired up with S(λ, t 1 , a) whereas in the second case is paired up with the different S value, S(λ, t 3 , c) (we could raise a similar question about the other two outcome values S(λ, t 1 , a) and S(λ, t 3 , c)). Nevertheless, as we have just remarked, our postulate of determinism insures that, once λ and t i have been given, the corresponding outcome S is fixed irrespective of the other outcome to which is paired up. This allows us to put the same value S(λ, t 2 , b) in Eqs. (1) and (3).
Obviously, for a given time, t i , we can have different measurement directions, i. e., different values, a, b, or c, for the vector function x, as far as we change λ in a convenient way. This means that the λ values which are present in (1), (2), (3), are the ones that assign the vectors a, b, c, respectively, to the times t 1 , t 2 , t 3 .
Then let us consider the difference
Henceforth, the proof of our inequalities goes along the same lines as the proof of the original Bell inequalities in the Bell's seminal paper [3] . First, since S 2 (λ, t 2 , b) = 1, the above difference can be written as
Then, taking absolute values, we are led to the inequality
that is, to the well known Bell inequality
Notice that, as it has been said in the Introduction, the postulate od determinism, which is behind the above proof, would loose all its likeliness for a non isolated system. Nevertheless, if a new part, not considered up to here, of the general environment were finally supposed to affect, sensibly enough, the original system, the inequality would then refer to the new system enlarged with this new environment part. Of course, it is to be expected that the larger this affecting environment become, the lesser become the possibility, if any, of violating the resulting inequality.
But, coming back to the question of testing inequality (7), whatever could be the difficulties to perform the kind of experiment we are considering, the three mean values in (7) can be calculated as the corresponding expected values dictated by quantum mechanics. These values become P (a, b) = a. b [11] [12] and similarly for P (b, c)and P (c, a). Thus, inequality (7) becomes
which is violated for b. c = 0 and a = ( a + c)/ √ 2, in which case the left hand side of inequality (8) reaches the value √ 2 . Thus, for the global system consisting of a 1/2-spin particle plus its affecting environment, including the measurement device selecting the measurement directions, the assumed determinism enters in contradiction with quantum mechanics.
This fail of determinism could come from the quantum system affected by some generic and hypothetical environment, or from the measurement device (or from both). Nevertheless, we always could perform the direction selection by a well determined procedure: one compatible with the equality of the three probabilities of obtaining one or another direction from the three initially fixed ones. Of course, this deterministic procedure is not expected to change the measurement outcomes. As a result, whatever could be the extent of a hypothetical environment acting on the particle which is submitted to successive measurements, we have proved that determinism for this particle and quantum mechanics are incompatible. In other words, there is no trajectory for this quantum particle whatever it were the kind of realism associated to the initial conditions: local or non-local realism, or realism of a conspiratory nature.
Notice that inequality (7) could be applied to any system, macroscopic or not, with a random dichotomic response to three kinds of consecutive measurements, only one of these three measurements being randomly selected each time, provide that we assume determinism for the time evolution of the system. Then, looking for the possible violation of such inequality could lead to test determinism in the natural world, beyond the particular case of a half one spin particle we have just tested.
At this point, it would be valuable to compare our results with other similar well known results in the literature on the subject: First, with the Kochen-Specker theorem [7] . According to the readable and simplified version of this theorem given in [8] , its two basic assumptions are counterfactual definiteness ("two non-compatible observables can simultaneously have predefined values") and non-contextuality ("the value of an observable ... does not depend on which other observables (compatible with it) have simultaneously defined values"). Obviously, in our case the postulate of determinism implies counterfactual definiteness, but now non-contextuality does not make sense since the measured observables (successive spin measurements) are incompatible observables, aside the fact that its measurement outcomes are not independent among them, but strongly correlated by hypothesis. Then, our results and the Kochen-Specker theorem deal with different situations.
Next we consider "The free will theorem" [9] . Here, the problem considered departs from the very beginning from the one considered in the present paper. While, in the frame of this theorem, the choice of directions in which to perform spin experiments is not a function of the information accessible to the experimenters, in our case this choice is assumed to be given in a deterministic way from some initial conditions, which could be known in principle by the experimenter, or even produced by his free will provided that the different directions appear with the same probability.
Finally, in [10] , under the following three postulates, macroscopic realism per se, noninvasive measurability and induction, Leggett claims to have proved some CHSH inequalities [4] , for the successive outcomes of a system with random dichotomic responses against four types of measurements. Our determinism postulate entails macroscopic realism per se, and noninvasive measurability, for the global system (the spin 1/2 particle plus the environment including the measurement device), but we have not needed to invoke the induction postulate to prove our Bell inequalities. Invoking this postulate in our case would entail restrictive conditions on the initial conditions, λ, that we have not needed to impose to prove our inequality (7) . Now, in according to what I have said at the end of the Introduction, it seems that this claimed non existence of a trajectory should also be considered from the point of view of the Bohm hidden variable theory, in order to see that there is no contradiction between the present claimed non determinism and this theory. In the next section we explain why this is actually the case.
3. The limits of Bhom theory of hidden variables. -Let us consider in detail to what extent is it really true that Bohm's hidden variable theories (HVT) can predict the existence of dynamical trajectories and at the same time be consistent with QM. It is true that Bohm [6] proves that his theory gives the same probability of finding a particle in a given position that QM does. From this, he concludes that his "interpretation is capable of leading in all possible experiments to identical predictions to those obtained from the usual interpretation", that is to say, to those obtained from QM. Then, when considering an entangled extended system, as in Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiments (similar to the ones considered by Bell in his seminal papers), Bohm assumes that his realism is non-local. In this way, his non-local HVT can explain the observed violation of the ordinary Bell inequalities, in agreement with QM, without having to give up realism (see [3] for example).
But is it always this way? Is it true that we can devise actual non-local HVT that lead to the same predictions that QM, for all conceivable experiments? Let us make some considerations in order to show why, from the very beginning, it is dubious that HVT, even if allowing for non-local realism, could always agree with QM to the extent of assigning a dynamical trajectory to each quantum particle when measurements are present. That is, to the extent of assuming determinism.
First of all, in these theories, each time that one performs a measurement on the particle position, if one wants to complete, beyond the obtained outcome, the precedent particle trajectory with a new trajectory piece, one must provide the probability density of the particle position just after this outcome. The provided probability becomes the new initial probability. Then, this new initial probability must be taken the same as the one dictated by standard QM if we want the HVT to agree henceforth with QM. After this, in the HVT framework, one does not need to worry about how this initial probability evolves in time until one performs a subsequent measurement, since, in the absence of any measurement, HVT are just designed to predict the same probability evolution as the one predicted by Schrödinger equation. But, as we will see in a moment, the real point is that when some consecutive different measurements are performed on the same particle [12] , one expects to find some well definite correlations among the corresponding outcomes: the correlations dictated by QM that lead, for example, to the violation of inequalities (7) . As it is asserted without proof (and without any preciseness about what type of realism would be ruled out), in [13] : "In QM, positions at different times do not commute, so ... some correlations referring to positions at different times fail to satisfy Bell's inequalities". As it has been shown above, what is actually violated, because of the QM, is some Bell-type inequality coming from the assumption of determinism based in local or non-local realism.
More precisely: either in QM or in HVT, the probabilities of each measurement outcome is given by the corresponding initial quantum state of the particle, just the state previous to the measurement. In HVT, these initial quantum states are supplemented with the assumed initial values of some non-local hidden variables, λ, leading to the deterministic time evolution of the system, in the absence of measurement. This determinism preserves, as it must be, the quantum evolution of the outcome probabilities. These initial λ values can always be established and this is the great triumph of Bohm theory. Nevertheless, the point here is that these λ values, which mimics so perfectly well the quantum evolution of the above probabilities, in the absence of measurement, have nothing to do with the explanation of the quantum correlations which are behind the reported quantum violation of inequalities (7) . It has nothing to do since these correlations have only to do with the quantum fact that these initial λ values need to be different before and after a given measurement on the particle, while they have to be the same if one assumes uncritically that we always can have deterministic dynamical trajectories for quantum particles in the framework of HVT theories. In other words, from the very beginning, and as we have done in the present paper, one should ask wether those quantum correlations will always be compatible with determinism, that is, with the assumption that some common initial conditions, λ, local or not, are behind all the successive measurements along the trajectory of a quantum particle. Then, the answer to this question has to be negative since, in the precedent Section, we have seen in detail how the inequality (7), which comes from the assumption of determinism, is violated by the corresponding quantum predictions.
Thus, if we mean by "trajectory" something more than a mere uninterrupted path, even a zigzagging one, to require the existence of determining initial conditions, and we accept QM, it seems that there is no room left "for models that force Nature to mimic the concept of trajectory" as it is still expected in [14] .
To summarize: according to the above discussions, either Quantum Mechanics, or determinism as such, must be false. So, if on the ground of its general success we accept QM, we must conclude that determinism as such could contradict experiments, an statement that would deserve being considered. Then the answer to the Leggett question [10] whether "it is indeed realism rather than locality which has to be sacrificed?" would be 'yes'. All in all: against Einstein's old dream, it seems that QM cannot be completed to the extent to allow for the existence of trajectories for quantum particles even when accounting for all its affecting environment. * * * This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, MEC-FEDER project No.FIS2006-06062. I also thank Dr Michael Hall by having made a number of useful critical comments to the manuscript, and Prof. Eliseu Borràs by his reading and comments.
